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New National Raw Materials Strategy: No Sustainability without Inclusion of Post-Mining

The goal of the German government’s new national raw materials strategy is to confront current and foreseeable future challenges in securing raw materials for the German economy and in particular for the German industry from 2020 onwards. Issues of sustainability will be given greater priority than in the first raw materials strategy from 2010, and for the first time aspects relating to post-mining will also be addressed. However, post-mining needs to be given much greater weight if the requirement for sustainability in the raw materials strategy is to be satisfied. Thus, Germany can set an example internationally and offer perspectives by referring to national practices and projects for a sustainable management of post-mining effects and in particular the consequences from phasing-out coal mining. It can also contribute to improving acceptance of the raw materials policy on a national level.

Author/Autor: Dr. Kai van de Loo, Gesamtverband Steinkohle e. V. (GVSt), Essen, und Technische Hochschule Georg Agricola (THGA), Bochum

1  Principles underlying the new national raw materials strategy

Fig. 1. BMWi information on the updating of the national raw materials strategy (4). // Bild 1. BMWi-Mitteilung zur Fortschreibung nationale Rohstoffstrategie (4).

The German government has been drawing up a new national raw materials strategy for some time. On 6 November 2019, the Grand Coalition in Germany presented its “Mid-term Review”, officially termed: “Progress report on the implementation of the coalition agreement by the Federal Government”, setting out that “Germany as the major technological base and exporting country depends on secure supplies of resources. We will be bringing the 2010 raw materials strategy up to date before the end of the year. Considering the myriad of new global challenges, we intend to support businesses in maintaining secure and sustainable supplies of raw materials and thus boost the international competitiveness of industry”(1). The new raw materials strategy was then published on 15th January 2020. As described, the German government’s first raw materials strategy from 2010 (2) has thus been brought up to date and adjusted to account for a series of new challenges regarding raw materials policies (Figure 1). The priority, as stated, is to secure raw materials for German industry and to bolster the industry value chain in Germany. However, the supply of raw materials as a whole should also be responsible and sustainable (3). The subject of post-mining has however not been explored in the new raw materials strategy, a shortcoming considering the premise of sustainability.

Officially, the first national raw materials strategy in 2010 was aimed at securing Germany a sustainable supply of non-energy raw materials which set it apart from the national reform in energy policies and related issues regarding raw materials. This raw materials strategy had already been preceded in 2007 by the German government’s “Elements of a Raw Materials Strategy” and the simultaneous appointment of an interdepartmental committee for raw materials, in addition to the EU’s raw materials initiative set up in 2008. All of this shows the growing importance of raw materials issues and policies. The latter, however, were to a great extent influenced by the boom of the “commodities super cycle” in the early 2000s in conjunction with dramatically increasing supply and price risks on many international commodities markets. In the view of the German government at the time, the aim was primarily to counter these developments by setting a regulatory framework, according to which it was fundamentally the responsibility of the business itself to ensure its supply of raw materials albeit accompanied by a series of measures from the government, in particular through political action against trade barriers and unfair competition on international markets. Above and beyond this, efficient management of resources and materials in Germany – refer to the adoption of the resource efficiency programme ProgRess in 2012 – and recycling were to be encouraged. Sources for supplies of raw materials were to be further diversified – in Germany, this included investment and loan guarantees for raw materials projects abroad or calling on German Federal States to take adequate consideration of domestic raw materials production in regional development plans. International partnerships for raw materials were to be initiated and last but not least development cooperation was to be expanded to include questions regarding raw materials as well. In addition, the German Raw Materials Agency (DERA) was established at the Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources (BGR) as a platform specifically for providing information and consultancy services relating to raw materials (Figure 2).

Fig. 2. DERA chart for the month of November 2019: demand for raw materials for the manufacture of battery cells. // Bild 2. DERA-Chart des Monats November 2019: Rohstoffbedarfe für Batteriezellfertigung. Source/Quelle: DERA

This first raw materials strategy succeeded in increasing awareness in industry and in society for resources to a certain degree, even though there is still room for progress in many respects. The individual measures in this strategy were successful only to a limited extent, as can be broadly concluded in retrospect. The intention with the planned new raw materials strategy is to undertake a thorough survey in this regard. When the wording of the 2010 raw materials strategy is scrutinised more closely, it is obvious that some aspects of sustainability were still barely taken into consideration in 2010. Post-mining related issues were not even mentioned, especially since energy resources, and hence also coal, were excluded completely. Similarly it has become clear in the meantime that macroeconomic, technological and political development poses partly new, partly radically different challenges for a raw materials policy. The raw materials sector faces such profound changes that the German government is seeking here, as in other areas, long-term forward-looking, hence strategic, solutions, (similar to the climate strategy, the digital strategy, the hydrogen strategy etc.). A systematic separation from the energy transition and/or energy resources no longer seems to make sense. The government now views the raw materials policy as an integral part of its industrial policy; the raw materials strategy is consequently part of a broader industrial strategy for the German economy that aims to strengthen the competitiveness of German industry and preserve jobs in industry. This follows on from the understanding that raw materials are at the start of any industrial value-creating process and that Germany, as one of the leading global technological bases and an industrialised exporting country, is heavily dependent on a secure supply of raw materials. In international comparison, Germany ranks as one of the major consumers of raw materials on account of its strong industrial base. Simultaneously, however, there is also a domestic industry producing raw materials that is of economic significance (5).

Accordingly, raw materials must be assigned greater economic importance in Germany, from sustainable mining to intelligent use of raw materials and responsible regulation of the impacts and legacies. Nevertheless, the political focus will continue to be on meeting the demand for raw materials. According to information from the German Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology (BMWi) itself, current prominent topics relating to raw materials are e. g. (6)::

  • considerable changes in demand due to developments in technology with, to some extent, a disruptive impact (i. e., energy transition and the electrification of transport will lead to a shift in the demand for raw materials towards “tomorrow’s raw materials” such as copper, rare earths or lithium, and so on);
  • the increasing number of trade disputes and barriers (protectionism);
  • market imbalance due to direct intervention by governments in the procurement of raw materials;
  • the predominance of individual companies and countries, China in particular.

Furthermore, greater importance than before has been attached to the questions of acceptance and public awareness for raw materials. In order to increase public acceptance specifically, the Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources is to be instructed with drawing up “information about raw materials in easily understandable language and making it available to schools and the population at large”, thus launching a type of publicity campaign and strategy to educate people about the complex issues of raw materials. At the same time, the new German raw materials strategy has also retained the three central elements for raw materials supply: domestic raw materials, imported raw materials and recycling in order to recover used raw materials. Domestic raw materials still account for the majority of the annual volume of raw materials required by the German economy, of which the German public knows surprisingly little. There are both, substantial domestic raw materials deposits and still a considerable amount of domestic mining. This not only concerns the now decommissioned hard coal mines and the lignite mines still in operation but also mining for potash and salts, rocks and earths or certain industrial minerals. The situation is different when it comes to metals and the majority of industrial minerals and energy resources. These have to be entirely or mostly imported with mineral oil remaining – from a quantity point of view – the most important source of energy in the national energy mix.

Where energy resources are concerned, there is still very considerable domestic production of lignite. There are also large deposits of hard coal, which, while no longer mined, are technically still extractable, even if coal will gradually decrease in importance in the supply of electricity and energy on account of the approved phasing out of coal-fired power generation and will have disappeared in less than two decades. It is anticipated however that gas as an energy resource and metals and industrial metals will gain in importance as raw materials in place of coal. The energy transition as a whole will not be achieved without an increased use of “tomorrow’s” or “high-tech raw materials”, as already mentioned previously. Energy transition has also caused a shift in coverage of the demand for raw materials, as illustrated by the example of the gypsum sector. This sector now currently meets its requirements for gypsum as a raw material in construction mostly by using REA gypsum from flue gas desulphurisation from coal-fired power plants. Therefore, in future, it will increasingly have to produce natural gypsum or reprocess used gypsum.

Compared to 2010 the government is not only placing significantly greater emphasis in 2019/2020 on sustainability aspects for energy resources, but also highlights specifically issues arising from supply chains and the recycling of raw materials. They set out in favour of domestic raw materials that without domestic production bottlenecks in supplies could occur. This would lead to price rises and also to a larger environmental footprint and greater impact on the climate if raw materials needed had to be imported and transported over longer distances. This also applies, e. g., to coking coal, domestic production of which was stopped with the complete phasing out of hard coal mining in 2018, which means it now has to be entirely imported and is now ranked as one of the so-called critical raw materials according to official estimates from the Raw Materials Supply Group appointed by the EU Commission with regard to risks to supplies in the EU.

The new raw materials strategy has also cautiously touched on another criterion for sustainability in this context, namely the issue of “sustainable decommissioning of mines” and thus key aspects of post-mining. According to the wording of the draft version: “Environmentally and socially compatible rehabilitation following the end of mining of raw materials is a central issue in production of raw materials”. The government therefore supports “orderly decommissioning of mines and the transformation of mining regions, such as former coalfields, e. g. In addition to protecting people and the environment, structural transformation of the regions is one of the key priorities. In the following, the planned establishment of a branch of the Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources (BGR) called “Sustainable Transformation in Former Mining Areas” in the Brandenburg/Saxony region is mentioned as one example for the implementation of the approach described above. The BGR’s task is “to pool knowledge about environmentally compatible and sustainable decommissioning of mines and also to disseminate this internationally”.

Under the heading “Responsible extraction of raw materials”, it is also noted that, even in the exploration and extraction stages, German mining law already includes mandatory procedures that also factor in environmental considerations for the time after mining operations have closed down. Mining sites, which were only ever used temporarily, must be made available again for subsequent use after the end of mining activity, although it is necessary to balance interests between ecological and economic concerns with regard to the type of subsequent use. In the international context, reference is made to the relevant UN principles, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and challenges posed by environmentally responsible mining and also the “containment of risk from polluted mine sites”.

It is certainly encouraging that “rehabilitation after the end of mineral resource extraction as a central issue” has been recognised, as every mining operation is finite, irrespective of whether there are economic or political reasons for stopping extraction or whether it is a result of physical depletion of the deposit. At some point therefore, every mine operation, as is clear from the outset, will be discontinued and then inevitably pass into a post-mining phase of different durations, even a never-ending phase under certain circumstances. This post-mining phase gives rise to minor or major ecological, social and economic problems that require appropriate solutions. This is why it is hard to understand the reticence here on the issue of post-mining and how little emphasis has been given to ambitions to achieve regional “transformation” and “structural change”, even if previous experience on a national level is limited and the risks involved in transformation cannot be ignored. However the German government would certainly have good reason, and also evidence of its own measures, to take a more vigorous stance in tackling this issue and set a positive example in international comparisons.

2  Sustainability requirements and post mining aspects in the new German raw materials strategy

As already mentioned, there is no extraction of finite resources, i.e. no mining, without post-mining. Post-mining encompasses all the obligations and processes that arise as a result of cessation of raw materials extraction. Or to quote the Research Institute of Post-Mining (FZN) at TH Georg Agricola University, Bochum: “Post-mining means everything that takes place in and around the deposit after the actual mining itself– a broad spectrum …”(7), which has a decisive impact on the future sustainability of former mining regions. That is to be taken into consideration as a matter of principle by the German raw materials policy, in the spirit of its assertion to sustainability and UN sustainability goals, to which the German government has also made a binding commitment (8) (Figure 3).

Fig. 3. Post-mining (research) has a “home”: the TH Georg Agricola University in Bochum. // Bild 3. Nachbergbau(forschung) hat ein „Zuhause“: Die TH Georg Agricola in Bochum. Source/Quelle: THGA

The political responsibility for raw materials in the relevant federal and state governments for domestic mines is irrefutable, the more so as this is already set forth in the German Federal Mining Act (BBergG) and other legal provisions for mining. With regard to the large volumes of raw materials imported into Germany and the processing of raw materials in this country or mining operations by German companies in foreign countries, there is at least a shared responsibility in respect of both, the relevant conditions in extracting raw materials and the question of post-mining after decommissioning. In this respect, it is essential that the subject of post-mining is part of the national raw materials strategy, and is addressed in sufficient detail, if this strategy is to live up to its claim of sustainability. This goes beyond “sustainable decommissioning of mines” and issues of “environmentally compatible and socially acceptable rehabilitation”, because – from a time and content point of view – the problems can only be narrowed down to a limited extent, since they are linked to the so-called “perpetual obligations” and further responsibilities for economic concepts for the future, and also in part since they must include the legacy from long-abandoned mines.

In practice, this expanded approach is always followed, simply because practical constraints dictate it. However in German politics, a somewhat reduced awareness of sustainability still seems to prevail in the public debate about raw materials. This is why the national umbrella organisation for mining, the Vereinigung Rohstoffe und Bergbau e. V. (VRB) in its pre-published opinion outlining amendments to the existing raw materials strategy, emphasized how important it is to create a greater awareness for raw materials in order to increase acceptance of the raw materials policy. It classed the raw materials strategy itself as a means to increase awareness for raw materials (9).

Moreover, the VRB examined the topics of “Post-mining and sustainability” in relative depth in its opinion of the new raw materials strategy and expanded on it properly: “An inherent part of mining is that it will one day end at a specific location. What is left is land that is to be designated for new use. The subject of post-mining and former mining operations is of major importance throughout Germany on account of the large number of old adits, shafts and mine galleries. However, former mines cannot always be traced back to existing companies that are still under an obligation. Especially in the case of relatively old mining operations, substantiating documentation is frequently lacking, even at the state authorities responsible for the regions. Today abandoned mines are therefore located using ultra-modern technology, secured if necessary, and placed under monitoring. Safeguards also include active searches for areas at risk from subsidence and reclaiming them if necessary. Insofar as it concerns the stability of at times centuries-old shafts that are the responsibility of other parties, there is currently still sufficient German expertise available, as a contracted service if needed. Post-mining covers activities after mining, hence contaminated sites and perpetual obligations, too. It includes developing long-term concepts for use of former mining areas and buildings, thus making a major contribution to structural transformation of the regions with coalfields. Responsibility for post-mining also encompasses all questions regarding “perpetual obligations”. These include mine water management, groundwater purification at former mining (coking) sites, creation of polders in areas with surface subsidence and geotechnical monitoring. The goal and claim in the context of the raw materials strategy could be that Germany follows the principle of sustainability also with regard to post-mining. This applies in particular to mining of ores and hard coal. For lignite-mining regions, the legislation package aiming to benefit the regions will provide orientation. Apart from taking the relevant ecological issues into consideration, this will also cover the social and economic aspects. The recommendations from the coal commission are exemplary. As a prerequisite for phasing out coal-fired power generation they emphasise social compatibility for workers and economic viability for the companies and regions concerned. The same should equally apply for all regions concerned (10).”

The VRB’s examination of the connection between sustainability in the raw materials strategy and post-mining is thus far more comprehensive and more nuanced than has so far been the case in relevant documents from the German government. Where domestic coal mining and post-mining in particular are concerned, in international comparisons the German government can certainly refer to its credentials, even to a pioneering role in “Just Transition”, which has previously been considered primarily as a contribution to climate protection. This is an even better fit, especially under the aspect of sustainability in the raw materials policy. Seven valid reasons are listed below as to why the national raw materials strategy should and also can assign even greater priority to the subject of post-mining, if it wants to satisfy its claim to sustainability at the same time.

  1. The end of subsidies for domestic hard coal mining, decided by politicians in 2007, has succeeded in terms of social compatibility, because the time frame and the underlying conditions imposed for the process of adjustment and phase-out were reasonable in length and relevant. Nonetheless this also required major efforts on the part of companies, the workforce, trade unions and management to achieve a reduction in jobs without redundancies. It was clear from the outset that the package of subsidies designed to cover this effort likewise needed to provide arrangements for funding the remaining temporary contamination at the abandoned sites after the phase-out of mining, as was the case at the time of active hard coal mining. This meant environmentally and socially compatible rehabilitation for the then full and final decommissioning of mines (Figures 4, 5).

    Fig. 4. RAG’s long-term responsibility – mine water management. // Bild 4. RAG-Zukunftsaufgabe Grubenwasserhaltung. Source/Quelle: RAG

    Fig. 5. Further improvements to mine water management in the Ruhr coalfields. // Bild 5. Weitere Optimierung Grubenwasserhaltung im Ruhrrevier. Source/Quelle: RAG

    That was agreed to and observed by the German federal government and the Federal States with coal mines, i.  the providers of the subsidies. In turn, RAG Aktiengesellschaft has proven reliable in keeping its side of the bargain. At the same time, a commercial solution was found from the first to resolve the problem of financing the so-called perpetual obligations (see above) by establishing the RAG-Stiftung. Its assets were created through capitalisation of the “white business” from the former diversified RAG Group and which cover the perpetual obligations by using these assets and liabilities that have increased through investment policies without the need for use of public funds. Only in an exceptional emergency, which as things now stand is hypothetical, would there be recourse to the public purse, in accordance with the so-called perpetual obligations agreement – this concept, which has been implemented successfully and is compatible with the claim to sustainability, has no equal in the world. This also allows for the fact that the RAG-Stiftung, in accordance with its statutes, has the option of supporting education, science and culture in the hard coal mining regions from its investment income. It does this by funding the THGA and the FZN established there, in particular by financing a foundation professorship and research commissions. In this way it actively supports scientific oversight in post-mining. It also contributes to structural change in the regions with a whole series of other educational projects. In this respect too, the sustainability aspect of decommissioning of mines is linked with the forward-looking orientation of post-mining, which in this case is unlimited to a certain extent (11).

  2. Post-mining with respect to lignite has been factored in from the start as part of the 2019 statutory regulations, which were decided by politicians in 2018 and which – aligned with the recommendations by the commission, appointed for this purpose, on “Growth, structural change, employment” (commonly known as the Coal Commission) (12) – governed the end of coal-fired power generation in Germany (Law for provision of structural support for coal regions/Coal Exit Law), which simultaneously signalled the phase-out of lignite mining in Germany. Above all, post-mining has been addressed in regional policies far more comprehensively than was the case when hard coal mining was phased out. On the one hand, considerations for financial safeguards in rehabilitating open-cast mines are taken account in conjunction with compensation payments for the premature end of the power plant/open-cast mining alliance in the lignite sector. On the other hand, the German federal government, together with coal-mining states, has agreed to provide massive structural aid for the lignite-mining regions and hard coal-fired power plant sites that are affected. This structural aid runs for almost 20 years – until 2038, the planned cut-off date for coal-fired power generation in Germany – and amounts to up to 40 bn € in total. It specifically includes measures for improving regional and local infrastructure in the broadest sense, while sustainability targets are pursued at the same time (13). In accordance with § 4 Subsection 2 of the draft law for provision of structural support for coal regions, the selection of areas to be supported aims specifically at stimulating investment that contributes to “1. Creating and maintaining jobs and apprenticeships/traineeships in the areas receiving funding …, 2. Diversifying the economic structure and improving the attractiveness of the regions receiving funding as a location for businesses … or 3. Meeting sustainability targets as part of the German sustainability strategy.” A prerequisite for these aid packages is that coal plants in the coal-mining areas are first decommissioned to the extent planned or that decommissioning has been agreed in a legally binding manner. They are therefore only activated, where lignite is concerned, at the start of post-mining. Where hard coal is concerned, according to the law for provision of structural support for coal regions, there are no hard coal coalfields or “hard coal regions” but only hard coal-fired power plant sites, because the phase-out of hard coal-fired power generation is not classed as equivalent to the previously agreed and completed exit from hard coal mining. Consequently there is no corresponding structural support for post-mining for domestic hard coal or its coalfields. Nonetheless, seven of the nine “hard coal-fired power plant sites with poor infrastructure that are eligible for support” are situated in the classic hard coal-mining areas in the Ruhr and Saar on account of the historic proximity of power plants to the deposits or mining sites (14). Even in this light, it is hard to comprehend why the German government does not place greater emphasis on “sustainable decommissioning of mines”, as addressed in the new raw materials strategy, in view of the major efforts it has already launched to compensate for the impact of these closures and to plan more sustainably.
  3. The latter issue gains even more in importance in the light of the fact that regional development in lignite-mining regions and hard coal-fired power plant sites, which is to be funded through structural aid for coal regions and is to take the aspects of energy and industrial policies into account, is itself dependent on a secure supply of raw materials. This applies, i. , to construction materials, other minerals and metals, which will be needed in the course of the comprehensive measures that have been announced for improving infrastructure in the coal regions. However, it has special relevance with respect to “tomorrow’s” raw materials, since a large number of incentive programmes have been designed specifically to support the reform in energy policies and climate protection. Some of the individual measures specifically target projects in the field of electromobility, power-to-X plants, “living labs” for technologies for energy transition or renewable value chains. The same holds true for the federal funding package for the future of coalfields (“Bundesförderprogramm Zukunft Revier”), which was set out in $ 15 of the draft law for structural support for coal regions. This funding package is intended to support projects in coal-mining areas – in this case the hard coal-fired power plant sites are included – and will help these regions transform into “national model regions for sustainable development, greenhouse gas neutrality and resource efficiency.” Accordingly, even all the sub-categories of the new national raw materials strategy, which generally contribute towards decarbonisation, more efficient extraction and use of raw materials and also to sustainability in the raw materials sector, so virtually the entire raw materials strategy, should be devoted to the structural transformation of the coal regions as a matter of priority.
  4. Conversely, the planned structural transformation in the coal regions focussing on energy transition and climate protection opens up some additional sources for energy resources, which should not be neglected by the new raw materials strategy. This is illustrated, for instance, with the setting up of a Fraunhofer Centre for Geothermal Energy and Energy Infrastructures, planned in accordance with § 17 no. 20 of the draft of the law for provision of structural support for coal regions. The remit of this centre will be to better research the geothermal potential of former coal-mining regions and how to develop them. Where post-mining for hard coal mines is concerned, several projects are already underway, such as those exploring further or new methods for energy recovery from mine gas and mine water following decommissioning of the sites. Heat from mine water – the project at the former Robert Müser hard coal colliery in Bochum is a prime example – is nothing other than a specific form of geothermal energy (15). Suitable former sites and infrastructure from hard coal and lignite mining (coal tips, brownfield sites) have already long been in use as sites for wind farms and solar parks and in this regard they constitute a type of “land resource”. Furthermore, a research centre for battery recycling is planned on the decommissioned site of the Ibben-büren hard coal colliery in conjunction with the projected new research institute for battery cell production in Münster. Specifically in the Rhineland’s lignite coalfields, a “model region for bioeconomics” is to be developed in accordance with the law for provision of structural support for coal regions. This, among other things, is to drive the use of biomass as a raw material. Other projects that have been deliberately situated in the coal regions aim to foster alternative fuels. One goal of the research initiative at “living labs for energy transition” is to use the former coal-fired power plant as a thermal accumulator. In accordance with the draft bill for the Coal Exit Law, existing coal-fired power plants are to remain in operation as power plants while coal is being phased out, provided they are switched over to gas and particularly if they operate combined heat and power plants and contribute to the regional supply of district heating. A pilot project run by STEAG GmbH at the hard coal-fired power plant site in Völklingen-Fenne aims to supply green gas from hydrogen (“Fenne Hydro Hub”) (16).
  5. “Coal Regions in Transition” (Figure 6), the initiative launched by the EU Commission in 2017 and now extended, applies across the entire EU and now supports similarly oriented initiatives in cooperation with non-EU countries, such as the Ukraine and also regions outside Europe.

    Fig. 6. Initiative Coal Regions in Transition. // Bild 6. EU-Initiative Coal Regions in Transition. Source/Quelle: EU-Kommission

    This initiative aims to make a “Just Transition” possible for the 41 coal regions in the EU as part of its decarbonisation strategy, meaning a fair and sustainable structural transformation also for those regions, which are, or have been, very dependent on extraction of coal until now and which, in this respect, need to plan post-mining successfully. To achieve this, they should have access to all existing options for structural support from the EU and also to those in the next EU budgets – initially for 2021 until 2027, in particular through the EU’s planned new Just Transition Fund. As part of this initiative, the EU Commission organises platforms for regular dialogue where, in addition to providing practical information and networking, productive sharing of experience is encouraged with respect to relevant current and past projects for the transition of coal regions away from coal. Of course, this initiative also includes the German coal regions. Unlike the national law for provision of structural support for coal regions, it covers the decommissioned German hard coal coalfields as well, which in terms of the EU requirement are still coal regions eligible for subsidies. Previous work by this initiative demonstrates both that the above-mentioned insights relating to raw materials from post-coal-mining apply on the national level as well as on the EU level. Since the new national raw materials strategy particularly emphasises the European dimension and cooperation in certain points, post-mining therefore also fits in this context (17).

  6. It is not only on the European level but also on international level, that post-mining and especially post coal-mining have become a topic that is important in many countries and not just at the present time. It also will gain in importance, because increased decommissioning of coal mines can be expected all over the world in the decades to come. The global trends in environmental and climate policies, but also developments on the energy markets and technical progress in coal mining itself are driving this pressure for decommissioning (18). In demonstrating how this process can be managed sustainably, Germany is in a position to really lead the way as a pioneer with examples of best practice. An international role as a pioneer is the goal aspired to for German climate policies as a whole, something which to date has been successful only to a limited extent. It may be a bold claim, because the natural conditions and economic structures here, the vital role of industry in our economy and the high standard of living in Germany are not particularly suited as a global example. If Germany adopts a raw materials policy with an enhanced focus on sustainability, one that takes equal account both of a secure and affordable supply of raw materials in accordance with social and ecological criteria and also of appropriate post-mining after the end of extraction of raw materials, and coal in particular, it would be in better position to assume a leading international position as a pioneer and would be more convincing.
  7. In conclusion, it hardly need be mentioned that, in view of today’s myriad problems regarding acceptance for polluting economic activities not only but also in the mining sector, the acceptance for a raw materials strategy in general and for domestic raw materials extraction in particular would be improved if they were linked with concepts for post-mining from the outset: hence, once it becomes clear that the consequences for people and for the environment from any production of raw materials, even after production finishes, are being taken into account properly and worked on appropriately. The new national raw materials strategy demonstrably intends to increase acceptance for extraction of raw materials, create public understanding of the importance of natural resources and improve the German public’s awareness for raw materials. To achieve this, there should be better public communications to illustrate and convey an understanding for the relationship between the production of raw materials, the variety of the resulting everyday products, the infrastructure and, for next-generation technologies, the related value creation, but also for the true impact on the environment and the climate. However this approach can only be really comprehensive if the issue of post-mining is properly addressed and included.

References/Quellenverzeichnis

References/Quellenverzeichnis

(1) Download from: https://www.bundesregierung.de/resource/blob/656734/1688860/8fc0065fec44576e75b8217f265bec2a/2019-11-06-bestandsaufnahme-data.pdf?download=1 ; similar statements can be found in the revised “2030 strategy for industry” presented at the end of November 2019 by the BMWi, which promises a “policy for more industry competitiveness”, addresses a broad range of topics and has a separate section entitled (p.17) “securing supplies of raw materials and driving the circular economy”, which refers to the updating of the raw materials strategy currently in progress. Also compare with the assessment by C. Tutt: “Regierung will der Industrie den Nachschub sichern” in the Wirtschaftswoche magazine dated 8/11/2019.

(2) The previous raw materials strategy from 2010 can be downloaded, e. g. from: http://www.rohstoffwissen.org/fileadmin/downloads/160720.rohstoffstrategie-der-bundesregierung.pdf

(3) https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/Publikationen/Industrie/rohstoffstrategie-der-bundesregierung.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=4

(4) https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/Pressemitteilungen/2020/20200115-altmaier-industrie-und-exportland-deutschland-braucht-eine-sichere-nachhaltige-und-verantwortungsvolle-rohstoffversorgung.html

(5) https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/Publikationen/Industrie/rohstoffstrategie-der-bundesregierung.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=4

(6) The last comprehensive survey of both direct and also indirect and induced effects of economic production and employment in domestic extraction of raw materials was carried out by E. Hillebrand/EEFA-Institut: Branchenanalyse Rohstoffindustrie, Studie im Auftrag der Hans Böckler-Stiftung, Düsseldorf 2016.

(7) cf. https://fzn.thga.de

(8) Refer to, e. g., https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/themen/nachhaltigkeitspolitik/ziele-fuer-eine-nachhaltige-entwicklung-weltweit-355966

(9) VRB annual report 2019, Berlin p. 22.

(10) Ibid. see p. 24 ff.

(11) Refer to i. a. RAG: 1968-2018. Meilensteine. Erfolge. Perspektiven. Essen 2019, a separate presentation from the RAG-Stiftung, including details of its statutes at https://www.rag-stiftung.de
and the international classification of the decommissioning process for German hard coal mines in: van de Loo, K.: Social Engineering for Coal Mine Closures – a World Bank Report, the International Research Deficit and Reflections from a German Perspective. In: Mining Report Glückauf 155 (2019) No. 4, pp. 394 – 412, specifically. p. 408 ff.

(12) For a presentation and appraisal of the recommendations from the Coal Commission, refer to van de Loo, K.: The Coal Exit – a High-Risk Adventure for the Energy Sector and Regional Economy: In: Mining Report Glückauf 155 (2019) No. 2, pp. 178 – 193.

(13) Refer to the draft bill from the German government for the law for provision of structural support for coal regions from 23/09/2019, Bundestag publication 19/13398.

(14) The two exceptions are the coastal communities of Wilhelmshaven and Rostock. Places that are eligible for subsidies in accordance with Section 12 of the draft bill for the law for provision of structural support for coal regions as hard coal-fired power plant sites with poor infrastructure, where the hard coal sector plays a considerable role in the economy, are five local authorities in the Ruhr coalfields – Duisburg, Gelsenkirchen, Hamm, Herne and Unna – and two in the Saar coal-mining regions, in this case the Saarbrücken regional authority and the district of Saarlouis.

(15) A survey of the “Entwicklung von innovativen und effizienten Wärmenutzungskonzepten unter Berücksichtigung der Bergbauinfrastruktur im Ruhrgebiet” is available on the website set up for the Ruhr-Universität Bochum/Lehrstuhl für Energiesysteme und Energiewirtschaft „Grubenwasser-Ruhr“, accessible at: https://www.gw-ruhr.rub.de; a similar project in another region is being conducted under the joint German-Czech project GeoMAP at TU Freiberg and TU Ostrava, see
https://tu-freiberg.de/fakult4/iwtt/ttd/geomap

(16) See Saarbrücker Zeitung 20/11/2019: Der (Wasser-)Stoff, aus dem die Träume sind.

(17) The EU Commission provides information about the issues and work of this initiative at: https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/oil-gas-and-coal/EU-coal-regions/coal-regions-transition; a type of annual status report on progress achieved and perspectives was presented at the Annual Political Dialogue on 25-26/11/2019 in Görlitz/Saxony.

(18) This was elaborated in greater detail in the World Bank report “Managing Mine Closure: A Just Transition for All” for the Global Climate Conference in Katowice in December 2018, which can be downloaded at: https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/extractiveindustries/publication/managing-coal-mine-closure; see also: Social Engineering…, by van de Loo, K. in the passage already cited.

Author/Autor: Dr. Kai van de Loo, Gesamtverband Steinkohle e. V. (GVSt), Essen, und Technische Hochschule Georg Agricola (THGA), Bochum