IEA Recommendations for “Just Transitions” in the Coal Sector
Reason for the IEA report and international situation
The IEA special report entitled “Accelerating Just Transitions for the Coal Sector. Strategies for rapid, secure and people-centred change” (1) was prepared at the request of the G7 presidency of Japan, published in March 2024 and follows up on corresponding requests from the recent UN Climate Change Conference COP28 (Figure 1).
This new special report on the coal sector is, to a certain extent, an update of the report “Coal in Net Zero Transitions” (2), which was published by the IEA in 2022. In addition to the implications for the energy industry, it emphasises also economic, social and regional policy aspects of the transition from the previous CO2-intensive coal use to a climate-friendly energy future with less coal consumption and presents a number of national case studies on this path. According to the IEA, this path does not have to mean a complete phase-out of coal, but it does mean a massive reduction in coal use without CO2 avoidance.
It remains the case that a good third of electricity generation and around 20 % of energy supply worldwide still depends on coal, which illustrates the enormous weight of the coal sector worldwide in the transition to a “net zero” energy economy. Coal remains the world’s No. 1 energy source for power generation. In 2023, coal’s share of power generation ranges from 20 % in Thailand or just above that level in the United States, to 30 % in Germany and Japan, 63 % in China, 71 % in India, 72 % in Poland, 87 % in South Africa and 95 % in Botswana.
In the new special report, the IEA once again presents updated international historical trends and forecasts for coal consumption, coal production and coal-related emissions (3). After global coal consumption, following its initially rapid growth, remained stable for about a decade after the turn of the millennium, with a slump in the COVID-19 crisis of 2020/21, it rose again in 2022 and 2023, reaching a new record level of almost 6 Gtce. China accounts for more than half of global coal production and consumption. India accounts for a further 12 % – almost as much as the share of all industrialised countries combined. China and India together now account for almost two-thirds of the global coal market. The EU’s global coal share is currently only 3 %.
Particularly noteworthy in this context is an overview by the IEA of existing coal-fired power plant capacities (as of 2021) in the world by country, their average age – as a measure of the associated “locked-in effect” – and historical coal-related CO2 emissions between 1900 and 2021, combined with a projection of future coal-related CO2 emissions between 2022 and 2100 if existing coal-fired capacities continue to operate unchanged (Table 1).
According to this, China has so far (until 2021) been responsible for 27 % of global coal-related CO2 emissions and would be responsible for a whopping 62 % in the future (until 2100). The historical “responsibility” of the USA for CO2 from coal is almost the same, but the future global share would only be 3 % according to the projection. India, e. g., would see its historical share of 7 % rise to 13 % in the projection. Germany’s share would fall from a historical 5 % to 1 %.
In addition to its importance for the energy industry, the coal sector also continues to play a significant role in terms of employment. According to the IEA, in 2022 there were still around 7.8 M employees (including unskilled labourers) working in the coal sector worldwide, with around 40 % of them working in coal mining and the rest in coal logistics, coal trading and coal processing as well as coal-fired power generation (around 340,000 of them). The majority of these coal jobs are concentrated in Asia: around 3.9 M in China, 2.1 M in India and 0.4 M in Indonesia. But there are still almost 300,000 jobs in Europe (excluding Russia), with almost 18,000 in Germany. (4)
Many of these jobs, as far as they are standardly secured (regular labour and collective agreements, social security, etc.), are relatively well paid. However, this does not apply to many unskilled labourers in less developed regions of the world, where pay is often low and working conditions poor. Over the past 25 years, productivity in the coal sector has increased significantly, mainly due to mechanisation in coal extraction. As a result, around 2.6 M jobs in coal mining have been lost in China alone. In Germany, hard coal mining was completely phased out in 2018. Massive changes have therefore already taken place in the employment relationships in coal extraction in the recent past, from which certain lessons can be learned. Although coal-related jobs account for only 0.25 % of all jobs worldwide, in coal regions the share is much higher and the problem of creating alternative employment is much more acute. In its APS (Announced Pledges Scenario – scenario of internationally announced plans for CO2 reduction), the IEA assumes that the global number of coal jobs will fall by almost 30 % to 5.6 M by 2030 as a result of the energy transition.
In this context, the IEA is calling for the “coal transitions” in power generation that many countries are striving for to be not only climate-friendly but also people-centred and just, to require comprehensive stakeholder engagement and to necessitate a whole range of policy measures to manage the consequences. By 2050, “net zero” plans have been announced for 85 % of energy-related CO2 emissions worldwide. National plans to reduce emissions and, in particular, to decarbonise electricity generation will therefore, if fully implemented, have a significant impact on employment in the coal sector and especially in coal mining. More than half of the job losses are likely to be due to the decline in coal production and consumption, with the other half attributable to further productivity improvements. 1.9 M coal mining jobs would disappear in developing and emerging countries, and another 325,000 coal mining jobs would be lost in industrialised countries. Overall, the share of coal in total employment in the energy sector would fall from 12 % to 7 % by 2030. At the same time, the IEA-APS projects an increase in global employment in the energy sector from around 67 to 80 M jobs, mainly in “green energies” in the broader sense, i.e. a total increase of almost 20 % (Figure 2).
The IEA believes it is possible to manage the transition away from carbon2-unmitigated coal use without compromising the affordability of electricity supply, i.e. without higher electricity prices. This is thanks to the competitiveness of alternative clean energy sources, from renewable energies to nuclear power and fossil fuels including coal with carbon dioxide capture and utilisation (CCUS), which has been achieved or is expected. In their APS scenario, the costs of (partially) replacing existing coal-based power generation and its system services, as well as the necessary expansion of the power grids, would be offset by savings in fuel costs. However, this depends on technical and economic developments, the respective national conditions and strategies, and differs from region to region. It is essential to ensure that the economy and security of the power supply continue to be guaranteed.
The last point, e. g., is also of great importance from an EU perspective. As the so-called Letta Report on the EU internal market from April 2024 has shown (5), reducing electricity costs for households and industry is currently one of the EU’s top priorities. The economic viability of the EU’s Green Deal and the prospects for its industry depend largely on this. From a German perspective, the IEA’s recommendations certainly give cause to critically reflect on the path taken in this country towards a complete phase-out of coal-fired power generation and to reconsider it in some specific areas. (6)
Coal phase-out targets and coal dependencies
Numerous countries around the world have now adopted climate protection targets in the sense of net zero emissions. In November 2023, this applied to 93 countries (plus the EU as a confederation of states), which account for almost 90 % of global gross domestic product (GDP) and 85 % of global CO2 emissions. This also implies an end to unabated coal use, with a number of countries already setting explicit coal phase-out targets. By the end of 2023, 84 countries, collectively accounting for 30 % of global electricity generation, had announced such explicit coal phase-out targets. However, less than half of them, such as Germany, have committed to a complete from coal-fired power generation as part of national phase-out plans, while others have only agreed to international coal phase-out agreements, the vast majority of which only apply to unabated coal-fired power generation. The two largest coal-consuming countries in the world, China and India, are not among them. Overall, 70 % of global coal consumption is not subject to any specific targets for coal reduction. (7)
According to the IEA, the willingness of individual countries to reduce their coal consumption obviously varies greatly depending on the degree of their coal dependency. The nature and extent of the effects of phasing out coal-fired power generation vary considerably in international comparison, depending on the availability of domestic coal resources, the share of coal in the energy mix, the economic structure and the labour market conditions. Due to not insignificant transport costs, only a limited amount of coal is traded internationally and most of it is sold on the domestic markets, which is why almost every national reduction in coal consumption damages the domestic coal industry.
To estimate the magnitude of the task associated with a transition away from coal for the respective countries, the IEA has developed a special “Coal Transition Exposure Index” (CTEI) (8), which consists of four components with two indicators each:
- Coal dependence of the energy sector (“energy dependence on coal”), quantified by the share of coal in total primary energy consumption and in electricity generation. This highlights the consequences of a coal phase-out for the national energy system.
- The level of economic development and the development gap, quantified by the national GDP per capita (in purchasing power parities) and the final energy consumption per capita. The IEA regards these indicators as proxies for a country’s expected future energy consumption growth and its technical and financial capacity. The extent to which new capacities for clean energies have to be added in the event of a coal reduction depends on this.
- Economic dependence on coal, measured by the share of coal in total national exports of goods and by the share of domestically produced coal in national coal consumption.
- The extent of the economic lock-in of existing national coal-utilisation capacities in the sense of capacities that have not yet been fully depreciated. The IEA has determined this on the basis of the capacity-weighted age of coal-fired power plants and integrated steel mills.
To create the CTEI index, the IEA normalised the raw data for these eight indicators and condensed them into a single value for each country. The country with the highest indicator was set to 1 and the country with the lowest indicator to 0, with all other countries receiving standard values in between. The values of each component for each country were then aggregated in a weighted manner to create a CTEI score. This calculation was carried out by the IEA for 21 coal-producing and coal-consuming countries, including the 15 largest coal producers and the 15 largest coal consumers in the world. Figure 3 shows the ranking of the CTEI scores from lowest for Canada to highest for Indonesia. It is remarkable how high the CTEI scores are for large countries such as China and India. Germany is at the lower end of the scale, but still has a higher CTEI score than the USA or Japan, e. g., which do not have a comparable explicit coal phase-out plan, despite decades of withdrawal and finally a complete phase-out of domestic hard coal in 2018.
The IEA points out that the CTEI scores calculated at the national level and the consequences of a coal phase-out within the individual countries can differ substantially between different provinces and regions. Coal mining is typically highly concentrated at the regional level. The provinces of Kalimantan in Indonesia, e. g., account for only 6 % of the population, but 90 % of the country’s coal production. Similarly, although coal production only accounts for a maximum of 3 % of the national GDP worldwide, in Indonesia it is 2 % and in China, e. g., only 6 %; but in some coal regions of the world this share is much higher, sometimes up to a third (as in the provinces of Cesar or La Guajira in Colombia). The same applies to the relative weight of employment in the coal sector, which in hardly any country in the world today exceeds 1 % of total employment, although it can be much more significant in some regions. Historically, there were far higher percentages of coal employment, e. g. in the UK, which at its peak once reached up to 7 %. There, as in other industrialised countries, including Germany, an enormous structural change in employment took place after the Second World War, not only away from coal mining, but also from industry as a whole towards services. This demonstrates the extent of change that is possible in the course of economic development, but it takes a relatively long time and does not require a complete phase-out of coal.
Energy policy management of the transition to lower-emission power generation
From the IEA’s point of view, it is imperative to move away from “unabated coal” by first providing a sufficient amount of new power generation capacity based on “clean energies” that can replace both power generation and system services. As demand for electricity increases, investment in new capacity must be driven forward more strongly than mere replacement would require. As mentioned above, the IEA’s definition of “clean energies” includes not only renewables, but also nuclear power, as well as coal or gas with carbon capture and utilisation (CCUS) technologies. (9) In its APS scenario, 75 % (but by no means 100 %) of the decline in coal-fired power generation worldwide by 2050 is replaced by wind power, photovoltaics (PV) and other renewables, as well as nuclear power. As a result of Russia’s attack on Ukraine, natural gas plays only a minor role for the IEA in replacing coal. Furthermore, the IEA assumes in its APS that from the mid-2020s and from 2030 to 2050, only a small number of new coal-fired power plants (on average just 1.5 GW/a) will be built worldwide and thus particularly in China without any emission reduction measures.
The early retirement of coal-fired power plants before the end of their technical lifespan after around 40 to 50 years of operation is only one option for reducing emissions, according to the IEA, and one that would have to take economic aspects into account as well as ensuring security of supply. Worldwide, only around a quarter of the current coal-fired power plant fleet (approximately 500 GW) will have reached the end of its technical lifespan by 2040. In 2022 alone, 50 GW of new capacity was brought online. However, political and economic factors such as tighter emissions standards, CO2 taxes and increased competition from other energy sources are likely to accelerate the decline. Harsh regulatory measures such as those in Germany in the form of lifetime restrictions, shutdown orders and new construction bans have so far been the exception internationally. The IEA is cautious in its description of this, stating that the cost-effective mix of direct regulation, financial incentives and market-based measures differs from country to country. You have to be able to afford to phase out coal.
In the event of early shutdowns, it often makes sense to convert existing power plants for new energy-related uses (“converting sites”). Modern coal-fired power plants contain a range of useful individual assets that offer options for alternative applications in the electricity sector or industry. This concerns the boilers, the water-steam and cooling systems, the turbine and generator, transformers, other equipment, the grid connections, the available land and also qualified personnel, the supply industry and service providers around the plant, but also the legal operating licence and existing local acceptance. The boilers, e. g., could be used as thermal energy storage to ensure grid services and grid stability. The IEA also cites examples of projects in the USA in which coal-fired power plants are being converted into sites for large-scale battery storage for electricity from renewable sources or for new nuclear power plants. In this context, the IEA particularly mentions the new, emerging technology of small modular reactors (SMR), which still requires research and demonstration to stimulate innovation and commercialisation, for which appropriate political and regulatory support must be created. Another example cited by the IEA is the mothballed Komati coal-fired power plant in South Africa, which is to be repurposed as part of the national transition strategy as a location for the installation of PV systems (150 MW), wind power (70 MW) and a battery storage system (150 MW) in conjunction with a retraining facility. This could be supplemented by a reference to the EU research project “Potentials” (10), which was completed in 2023 and the subject of which was the repurposing of integrated coal sites – power plants and mines – in Europe for clean energies. Meanwhile, there are no state conversion programmes for coal sites in Germany that are as open to technology as those discussed by the IEA or examined by the Potentials project.
One of the possibilities for operating coal-fired power plants with significantly lower CO2 emissions, without sacrificing their controllable output, is to increase co-firing with low-CO2 fuels that partially replace coal. The USA, UK and India have been co-firing with biomass for some time, while other countries have been co-firing with biogenic and non-biogenic waste. More recently, co-firing with ammonia has been tested, primarily in Japan. Since 2017, the technical possibility of adding 1 % ammonia has been successfully demonstrated. Meanwhile, there is a first large-scale trial of blending with as much as 20 % ammonia, which, however, requires more extensive retrofitting, additional facilities and more space on the site, good transport connections and reliable sources of supply. In addition, the long-term economic viability of co-firing generally depends on the development of fuel costs.
It is also possible to achieve dispatchable and almost climate-neutral coal-based power generation by retrofitting existing plants with CCUS technology, as the IEA emphasises. This requires CO2 capture methods such as the oxyfuel process, which necessitate internal conversion and additional external equipment for the power plants, as well as facilities for CO2 transport to the storage or utilisation options. CCUS can currently be used to sequester a good 90 % of the CO2 from power plant flue gases, with 99 % expected in the future. However, a certain amount of energy consumption is also required for this, which reduces the net electricity yield. The same would apply to oil or gas-fired power plants with CCUS. The question of economic efficiency is likely to depend largely on the energy policy framework (Figure 4).
There are already a number of large-scale and commercially operated coal-fired power plants such as Petra Nova in Texas/USA and Boundary Dam in Saskatchewan/Canada, as well as two further coal-fired power plants plus a demonstration plant in China. According to the IEA report, 15 additional coal-fired power plants with CCUS are in the planning stage worldwide and the technology has reached a marketable level of maturity in other sectors as well as in connection with coal use. According to the IEA, coal-fired power generation with CCUS can now compete with other low-emission dispatchable technologies and with unabated coal plus carbon pricing. As a result, coal with CCUS accounts for a significantly increasing share of remaining coal consumption in the IEA scenarios, and even up to 100 % in the zero-emissions scenario for 2050. According to the IEA, retrofitting with CCUS is an attractive option in particular where coal-fired power plants are operated in close proximity to active coal mining, as is the case with German lignite, e. g., and thus mining jobs can be preserved and mining communities supported at the same time.
Furthermore, coal-fired power generation can also be associated with drastically lower CO2 emissions without the aforementioned options if power plant operation is made more flexible and limited to reserve and balancing functions for volatile renewable energies, as the energy transition is bringing about in any case (“repurposing with flexibility”). In its APS scenario, the IEA calculates a global reduction in the average capacity factor of coal-fired power plants from 52 % in 2023 to 23 % in 2050; in other scenarios, the typical capacity factor is even lower. With only a few operating hours and otherwise remaining in a holding pattern, there are also only a few CO2 emissions. The problem, of course, is that only a small amount of electricity generation means only a small amount of electricity revenue and that economic and financial difficulties arise for the power plant operators if the respective electricity market design does not remunerate the flexibility or corresponding security of supply. From a macroeconomic perspective, however, it may be the more cost-effective solution to have existing coal-fired power plants provide this service than to decommission them and fully write them off, and instead build other new power plants for this purpose. The IEA’s special report implies that this should be examined.
Financing options for the transition in coal-fired power generation
The latter point also describes a major economic obstacle to the transition towards the politically desired “clean energy investments”. Substantial amounts of capital are tied up in the coal-fired power plants that exist today, and these must first be refinanced by the power plant operators and linked to profits before major new investments can be made and absorbed. In addition, the financing leeway for new investments, as well as that for the viability of premature decommissioning, has recently narrowed across the board due to increased inflation, higher interest rates and disruptions in global supply chains. At the same time, (climate) policy in many countries is trying to facilitate the financing of clean energies by making it more difficult to finance investments in the coal sector or the construction of new coal-fired power plants. (11) Against this backdrop, the IEA explicitly warns against disregarding the ultimate energy policy priority for any kind of coal transition, namely ensuring the security of the electricity supply. There is no one-size-fits-all solution for phasing out coal; the type and age of the power plants, as well as the respective market structures and energy policy requirements, must always be taken into account.
The IEA highlights various national examples of how the financing of coal-fired power plants is being restricted by policy. In Germany, the state-owned Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) stopped all lending for the construction of new coal-fired power plants in 2019, which has been prohibited since 2020, as well as for other coal-related business areas – existing coal-fired power generation and district heating, coal production and transport. In the EU, the European Investment Bank (EIB) ended its financing of traditional fossil fuels, including coal, in 2021, and a “sustainable taxonomy” has been introduced on the capital market. Canada and India are also working on a green taxonomy. In Canada, as in some other OECD countries, no export credits are granted for coal-fired power plant technology. China has announced that it will no longer finance coal-fired power plants abroad. In Japan, there is no longer any government support for “unabated coal” abroad and, with a transition phase until 2030, no longer for “inefficient” coal-fired power plants at home. In South Korea, public banks must align their lending with the government’s plan to phase out coal by 2050. In the US, federal export credits for unabated coal were stopped in 2021 and the SEC established stricter ESG criteria in April 2022, including at the expense of coal financing. However, there are divergent regulations at the level of individual states.
The IEA, for its part, is discussing further possibilities for promoting the decommissioning of existing or not yet completed coal-fired power plants. This typically assumes that the operating costs for the operator would likely be higher than the risk-adjusted revenues. In addition to government intervention such as direct regulation or nationalisation, which the IEA mentions but does not recommend, this can be done through financial incentives and market-based instruments. CO2 pricing, as in the EU ETS, can be used to monetarise emissions, so to speak. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has developed an Energy Transition Mechanism (ETM) that pools financial capital from a range of investors to facilitate a low-interest coal phase-out through two new financing vehicles. A Carbon Reduction Facility is designed to refinance early closures or repurposing in the coal sector, while a Clean Energy Facility is intended to facilitate similar investments. Some countries, such as Germany, have organised state compensation for the early closure of coal-fired power plants in combination with auctions. Other countries rely on state interest subsidies or debt relief for state creditors or, like the US, on tax incentives for accelerated depreciation. Other financing options include special levies on electricity prices, customer-backed securitisation or sustainability-linked bonds.
Conditions for a humane transition of the coal sector
The global efforts to decarbonise electricity generation, if fully implemented, will have a severe impact on employment in the coal sector, particularly in coal extraction. The public acceptance and justness of this transition – which, as the IEA emphasises, must be not only climate-friendly but also people-friendly – depends on the most effective policy measures possible to manage these job losses. The options for this include income support such as severance packages, social measures and early retirement provisions. Some governments also offer retraining and training programmes, as well as job counselling and other employment assistance, to displaced coal workers. However, so far (as of the end of 2023), only 14 % of coal workers in the most coal-dependent countries worldwide are covered by just transition programmes – still 10 % more than a year earlier. In addition to further measures of this kind, active measures for industrialisation and the establishment of new economic activities as well as initiatives for environmental remediation are needed for underdeveloped or structurally weak coal regions. The IEA has taken a closer look at and compared the just transition policies in the coal sector for a few selected countries, including Germany (Table 2). (12)
The Global Commission on People-Centred Energy Transitions has also developed conceptual recommendations for people-centred transitions. It emphasises that the transition to clean energies must take into account access to energy, energy affordability, the respective socio-economic development of the region, an inclusive approach to policy-making and the International Labour Organization (ILO) standards for a just transition in labour markets. The latter includes active government support for workers affected by the energy transition, the creation of adequate and decent new employment opportunities, respect for fundamental occupational safety and health and labour rights, and effective social dialogue. The IEA concludes that three complementary objectives should be pursued for the coal transition:
- Effective political support for workers and companies in transition.
- Developing alternative economic sectors and stimulating regional economic growth to provide complementary employment opportunities.
- Improving the quality of life and social cohesion, e. g. by rehabilitating the environment, making locations more attractive and promoting local culture and identity.
In addition, the IEA presents some highlights of the coal transition policies of different countries: from the USA, where a particular focus is on strengthening infrastructure in coal regions, to China, where regional diversification programmes have been launched, and India, which has set up a “Skill Council for Green Jobs”, to Poland, which provides very specific state benefits for coal miners in the form of income tax and health insurance. One passage also applies to Spain, which is pursuing a just transition strategy for the coal sector, including regional development plans and a framework agreement between the government, trade unions and energy companies that was last concluded in 2020 and is intended to provide new employment prospects every five years.
Conclusions from a German perspective
From a German perspective, a regular formal update of the coal phase-out, which is to be completed by 2038 or, in the view of the current coalition government, “ideally” by 2030, would also be a good idea. The German Coal Phase-out Act does provide for fixed review dates with regard to the respective energy policy situation (13), but these have not yet been met and, as far as the prospects for security of electricity supply in Germany are concerned, they give rise to considerable criticism. (14) What is also still missing is a regulated monitoring of the effects of the coal phase-out on structural change and employment in the affected regions. The coal phase-out, which was decided upon politically in 2018 and legally initiated in 2020, remains “an adventure in energy and regional policy”. (15)
As the IEA recommendations and their examples from around the world show, a total coal phase-out, as the German government is striving for, is by no means without alternatives in terms of climate policy either. Existing coal-fired power plants could be retrofitted with CCUS technology and even be used for the long-term, regular, low-emission generation of electricity and, if necessary, district heating, which would be advantageous for the security of supply and economic efficiency of the energy transition compared to the construction of new H2-ready gas-fired power plants, which has been announced with great aplomb by politicians but so far only rudimentarily initiated. Even without CCUS, coal-fired power plants that are kept on standby and only used for balancing and reserve functions, and consequently only at low capacity and emission levels, could play a flexible role as system service providers in the energy transition. (15) Finally, there are a number of possibilities for repurposing existing coal-fired power plant sites for alternative energies and/or energy storage, with lignite still being used in some cases in conjunction with active mining operations. Heat or mine gas from abandoned coal mines, as well as the surface areas and spoil tips, also offer untapped energy potential. Although there are numerous projects in this area, there is as yet no systematic energy policy to support the transformation of the coal sector.
References / Quellenverzeichnis
(1) IEA Report (2024): Accelerating just transitions for the coal sector. Strategies for rapid, secure and people-centered change. March 2024. Download: https://www.iea.org/reports/accelerating-just-transitions-for-the-coal-sector
(2) IEA Report (2022): Coal in Net Zero Transitions. November 2022. Download: https://www.iea.org/reports/coal-in-net-zero-transitions
(3) IEA 2024, S. 13ff.
(4) Euracoal 2024: Coal industry across Europe. 8. Edition, p. 7. Download: https://public.euracoal.eu/download/Public-Archive/Library/Coal-industry-across-Europe/EURACOAL-Coal-industry-across-Europe-8ed.pdf
(5) Siehe Enrico Letta – Much more than a market (April 2024). Download: https://european-research-area.ec.europa.eu/documents/letta-report-much-more-market-april-2024
(6) van de Loo, K. (2024): Warum eigentlich noch Kohleausstieg? In: Mining Report Glückauf (160) Heft 2, S. 165 – 178.
(7) IEA 2024, S. 19ff.
(8) Ebenda S. 23ff.
(9) Ebenda S. 28ff.
(10) Einen Überblick zu Forschungsansatz und Ergebnissen des EU- bzw. RFCS-Projekts Potentials einschließlich von Best Practice Guidelines liefert die Website https://potentialsproject.uniovi.es/
(11) IEA 2024, S. 43ff.
(12) Ebenda, S. 57ff.
(13) Siehe dazu § 54 KVBG (Kohleverstromungsbeendigungsgesetz). Abrufbar zusammen mit anderen einschlägigen Vorgaben beim BMWK unter: https://www.bmwk.de/Redaktion/DE/Downloads/Energie/ueberprufung-der-reduzierung-und-beendigung-der-kohleverstromung.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=1
(14) Bundesrechnungshof (2024): Energiewende nicht auf Kurs: Nachsteuern dringend erforderlich. März 2024, insb. S.7f.; darin sieht die Bundesrechnungshof in Deutschland nicht nur die Sicherheit der Energieversorgung gefährdet, sondern auch das Ziel der Bezahlbarkeit der Energieversorgung angesichts hoher Strom- und Energiepreise und des absehbaren Risikos weiterer Strompreissteigerungen. Zudem lasse sich die Umweltverträglichkeit der Energiewende nicht beurteilen, weil neben den Treibhausgasminderungen keine oder nur unzureichende Daten über andere Umweltfolgen erhoben werden und bislang kein wissenschaftliches Monitoring zu negativen Auswirkungen auf andere Schutzgüter wie Flächen, Ressourcen oder biologische Vielfalt erfolgt. Der Sonderbericht ist abrufbar unter: https://www.bundesrechnungshof.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Berichte/2024/energiewende-volltext.html?nn=23102
(15) van de Loo, K. (2019): Der Kohleausstieg – ein energie- und regionalwirtschaftliches Abenteuer. In: Mining Report Glückauf (155), Heft 2, S. 178 – 193.
(16) Siehe van de Loo 2024, insb. S. 175f.
